
Rail and Competition

Workshop Universität Gießen


Guido Friebel Goethe Universität Frankfurt 27 May 2010

EU: Heterogeneity in freight traffic




Source: ProgTrans AG "European Transport Report 2007 / 2008", IBM-Liberalization Index Rail 2007

EU: Heterogeneity in market opening



What can be done in 15 Minutes?

- O Three markets:
 - Freight
 - Regional/urban passenger traffic
 - Long-haul passenger, in particular, high speed
- Same regulatory framework through EU directives, but high degree of implementation heterogeneity in Europe
- Many submarkets (networks, O&Ds)
- What is crucial in what market?
 - Freight: inter-modal, and competition in the market
 - Regional/urban passenger: competition for the market
 - Long-haul passenger: intermodal traffic



Structural models, simulations

Freight

- EU 15: Modal split between 1995 and 2008 relatively stable (from 15% to 13%)
- EU 27: decrease from 22% to 18% (Poland: from 62% to 35%!)
- Profound structural changes: entry, alliances, acquisitions:
 - SNCF Fret acquired international operations of Veolia Cargo
 - DB bought PCC in Poland etc
- Market share of DB competitors in Germany increased from 7% in 2003 to 25% in 2009
- Market share of DB freight in french market around 10% in 2009


Regional/urban traffic: Germany

Action in competition *for* the market:

 market share of DB's competitors increased from 10% in 2003 to 20% in 2009

 in 2009, DB won around 70% of the procured traffic volume

Source: DB competition report 2009 Figures: Mio pass kms




Long-haul passenger traffic

- Less action than in freight market
- O No entry of Keolis in Germany?
- O Takeover of Keolis by Arriva?
- O Entry of DB/ÖBB in Italian market
- News from intermodal competitors: long-distance busses to be allowed in Germany
- Market share Bus in other countries:
 1.5% in UK, 7% in Sweden, 4% in US
- Inter-modal competition

A case study on inter-modal competition (Friebel, Niffka, Review of Network Econ)

- Usefulness of experiments = entry of competitors
- Example: « low-cost » Airlines in Germany
- Cologne Hamburg
 - Hapag-Lloyd
 - Aggressive price reaction of Lufthansa
- Market share of train « Metropolitan » fell by 30%
- O Metropolitan reaction, new price system:
 - market share stabilized
 - Massive revenue losses
 - But, eventually exit of the Metropolitan




A model a of inter- and intra-modal competition (Ivaldi and Vibes in JTEP)


Liberalization / deregulation


- Airlines, railways (incumbents and entrants)
- Competition in prices and transport service levels
 - > Newcomers, new strategies
- Changes in regulatory environment
 - Changes in taxation of transport modes
- How to Model Inter- and Intra-modal Competition?
 Use game theory
- What market shares for railroads (if any)?
 Which optimal strategies for railways in a highly competitive market?

Method: A simulation model

- O Cologne-Berlin
 - 🗅 ≈ 600 km
 - Rail operators
 - > DB
 - > Connex
 - Airlines
 - Lufthansa
 - Low-cost airlines
 - DBA, HLX, GW
 - Private cars







Results: prospects of operators

- Slow railroad competitor (similar as Connex entry): model predicts exit
- Low-cost airlines: model predicts good performance

Low-cost fast train

- The model predicts a significant market share
 - Leisure market: 20 to 30 percent
 - Business market: 7 to 13 percent
- DB loses market shares
 - Leisure market: -15 to -25 percent
 - Business market: -7 to -13 percent

Implications

- Look closely at specificities of the sub-market
- Identify the most powerful competitive mechanism
- Freight:
 - open up further, let the market handle it,
 - in the long run, the issue may be anti-trust
- O Regional passenger traffic:
 - better procurement methods, allow variety of bidders to participate,
 - increase transparency
- Long-haul passenger:
 - not much intra-modal action yet,
 - but strong inter-modal competition

